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3This paper reviews the reform of and current trends in the Hungarian banking system and
draws some lessons that can be useful for countries where the reforms are less advanced. The
point is made in the paper that since the weak financial position of state enterprises has been
one of the major sources of difficulties encountered by the banks in transition economies, it is
crucial that the restructuring of the banks and enterprises go hand in hand. One lesson
learned is that consolidation should be based on an accurate assessment of the difficulties of
the banks to reduce the cost of consolidation and should be accompanied by a strengthening
of regulation and supervision to prevent the reproduction of losses. The paper also discusses
the reasons for the low depth of financial intermediation in Hungary and concludes that this
situation will change only slowly.
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6I. Introduction*
Restructuring the banking systems in Central and Eastern European countries of
transition (CEECs) to meet the requirements of a market economy has been a unique
challenge of the past ten years. Market oriented reforms and bank restructuring are
closely linked, since the success of transition from a centrally managed economy
dominated by state ownership to a market economy based on private ownership greatly
depends on the stability of the financial system. At the same time, reform of the
banking system can not be implemented without: (1) macroeconomic stability; (2) a
restructuring of the corporate sector; and (3) a reform of the regulatory framework.
Market reforms are thus intertwined. Although the consolidations of the banking
sectors have placed heavy burdens on the government budgets in the CEECs, the need
for a comprehensive bank consolidation and restructuring can no longer be questioned
in the light of experiences of the most advanced transition economies. There is general
agreement among observers that Hungary has one of the strongest and most stable
banking systems in the CEECs today. Hence, an examination of the Hungarian
banking reform might provide some useful lessons for the countries less advanced on
the road towards the market-orientated transformation of their banking sector.
Hungary was the first CEEC to embark upon a reform of its banking system. As
was typically the case in the CEECs, Hungary had a monobank system prior to the
reform, with the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) performing both central banking
and commercial banking functions. As a first step, these two functions were separated
and a two-tier banking system was created with the establishment of three state-owned
banks which took over most of the commercial banking functions of the NBH in 1987.
The latter became a central bank in the classical sense, although it retained for a while
some para-fiscal functions, such as managing the government debt, and a limited range
of commercial banking activity, such as channeling funds from official external
sources to the domestic banking sector. Furthermore, the NBH retained initially the
ownership of three commercial banks operating abroad and kept a minority ownership
in two foreign invested private commercial banks operating in Hungary. The NBH
divested itself of these activities over the years so that by now it performs only central
banking functions.
As in most CEECs, there existed in Hungary, in addition to the monobank, two
specialized state-owned banks prior to the establishment of the two-tier banking
system. These were the National Savings Bank (NSB) set up to provide banking
services for households and the Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank (HFTB) specialized in
the financing of foreign trade. Foreign ownership was present with three joint venture
commercial banks, one set up with off-shore status in 1979 and two set up with
                                             
* This paper was presented at the Seventh Dubrovnik Economic Conference, Dubrovnik, Croatia, June 28-30,
2001. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar on “Reforming and Opening Up China’s
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7domestic status in 1985-86. However, the market share of these foreign banks was
small, about 5 percent in 1990.
II. Causes of the Crisis in the Banking Sector
Banking crises can have many causes, but since the transition from a centrally
managed to a market economy has some special aspects, the banking crises in the
CEECs have had a number of common characteristics which have set them somewhat
apart from the other banking crises in the world. The main causes of the banking crises
in the transition countries can be traced back to the combination of the following
factors: (1) the sharp drop in aggregate demand and output in the initial years of the
reform; (2) the inheritance of bad loan portfolios from earlier times when credit was
centrally directed; (3) segmentation of the credit market and lack of competition; (4)
shortcomings in the regulatory and supervisory frameworks; and (5) weak
management, inadequate internal control and large administrative costs of banks.
As known, the political and economic reforms led to the collapse of the markets
in the countries of the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA),
previously the principal export markets of the CEECs. The collapse of the CMEA
trade triggered sharp falls in aggregate demand and output in all the CEECs. The
liberalization of trade and the consequent increase in competition also contributed to
the drop in output. In Hungary, GDP fell by about 20 percent in real terms during
1990-93 and similar or higher drops in GDP were registered in the other CEECs.
Many corporate clients of the banks went bankrupt and were closed down, the ones
that survived had difficulties to service their debt. The firms’ ability to service their
debt was also affected by the upsurge in real interest rates following the deregulation
of interest rates and a rise in inflation that typically accompanied the liberalization of
prices. During this period, inter enterprise credit rose substantially, which prolonged
the survival of firms and delayed the surfacing of the true extent of the bad loan
portfolio problem which later confronted the banks.
The creation of the two-tier banking system in Hungary left the ownership
structure untouched, with the sate retaining ownership over the banks which were
greatly undercapitalized. The three newly established banks inherited a large amount
of non-performing loan portfolio1, since under the monobank system the extension of
credit followed government directives and was not governed by profit considerations.
The banking sector was characterized by strong sectoral segmentation because the
portfolios taken over from the NBH by the three newly established commercial banks
were distributed along sectoral lines: one received the heavy industry, manufacturing
and part of the energy portfolio; another most of the agricultural portfolio; and the
third the mining and services portfolio. This sectoral segmentation aggravated the
banks’ situation in Hungary, since it reduced the effectiveness of resource allocation
and hindered the diversification of risks. The sectoral segmentation has proved to be
difficult to do away with because of the natural inertia in bank-client relationships. 
                                             
1 Loans are generally classified as: “problem free”, “to be watched”, “sub-standard”, “doubtful” and “bad”.
When we talk about bad or non-performing loans in this paper, we refer to the last three categories as a group.
8One early lesson of the bank reform in Hungary is that the distribution of the
corporate portfolios among the newly established commercial banks along sectoral
lines was a mistake. Some sectoral specialization of banks exists in many well
functioning banking systems, but a too heavy concentration exposes the banks to
unduly high risks by tying them to the performance of one or two particular sectors.
Moreover, it weakened competition, which was also hampered by the restrictions
initially imposed on the free choice of banking. In addition, the inherited dominance of
the household market by the NSB has hindered the other banks’ ability to expand their
deposit base.
Shortcomings in the regulatory framework also contributed importantly to the
banking sector’s problems. Prior to 1992, the existing rules for loan classification and
provisions did not force the banks to practice prudent lending and to make adequate
loan loss provisions. The rules for classifying problem loans did not correspond to
international standards and were much less strict. It was left to the banks’ own
discretion how much they wished to provision. The provisioning for bad loans could
be set aside only from after-tax profits, which provided little incentives for the banks
to provision. The result was that the true problems of the banks were masked from the
eye of the public and the government, and often even from the eye of the bank’s
management itself.
A dramatic change had occurred in this situation with the enactment of a
number of new laws at the end of 1991, which has since been characterized as a
“legislative shock therapy”. The Financial Institutions Act imposed stricter rules for
loan classification based on, although not yet fully conform to, international standards.
It made loan-loss provisioning compulsory and the tax law was amended to allow the
provisions to be made from pre-tax profits. The new Accounting Act did no longer
permit unrealized interest rate receipts to be entered as income in the books of the
banks, a measure aimed at encouraging debt collection. The Bankruptcy Law required
the firms to initiate self-bankruptcy procedures when they defaulted on their debt for
more than 90 days. This rule, which was more stringent than the prevailing regulations
in many developed countries and was strictly enforced, deflated the inter  enterprise
credit balloon and triggered a wave of bankruptcies across the economy. Painful as it
was, this process helped to weed out the unviable companies in the early stages of the
reform, bringing to the surface the banks’ already realized losses and narrowing at the
same time the opportunity to accumulate further losses, which in the end reduced the
cost of bank consolidation. In contrast, the lack of stringent bankruptcy rules in the
Czech Republic, for instance, prolonged the market cleaning process and the time for
the losses of the banking system to surface, adding to the eventual cost of restructuring
(see below).
The banks also suffered from weak management practices. The newly
established commercial banks had not enough experienced staff well versed in
commercial banking and the modern methods of risk assessment. Although the banks
gradually improved the competence of their staff, bad and irresponsible lending
decisions were abundant in the early years of the reform. For instance “evergreening”,
whereby loans overdue are continuously renewed, was widely practiced. The decision-
making mechanism often lacked a proper definition of responsibilities and the banks
were slow in adopting adequate internal regulations. Decisions breaching the banks’
9own internal regulations were frequent because of the lack of adequate internal
controls. The inadequacy of the intra– and interbank information systems also
weakened the quality of decisions. For instance, a client could borrow from different
branches of the same bank, without the center knowing about it. Obviously such
practice prevented the bank from making a proper assessment of risks. Similarly,
taking advantage of the lack of adequate interbank debtor information systems, an
unscrupulous client could mortgage his real estate several times over by going to
different banks for a loan. The long delays in the registration of real estate transactions
and other weaknesses in the registration system compounded the problems.
The corporate governance of the banks also suffered from deficiencies. Many of
the people delegated by the state to the banks’ boards of directors or supervisory
boards were either people to whom the state wanted to make a favor or civil servants
who were delegated there in order to supplement their maigre income. Many of these
people were unprepared to fulfill the required managerial and supervisory
responsibilities in the governing bodies of the banks. The fact that state-owned
companies were major shareholders in some of the banks resulted in an intertwining of
owner-creditor roles which hampered financial prudence.
Bank supervision was also inadequate initially. Since under the monobank
system practically no outside supervisory control existed, it took considerable time for
bank supervision to grow up to the task. At first, bank supervision was performed by a
department in the Ministry of Finance. The supervisory tasks were transferred to an
autonomous agency in 1992, but for reasons of inadequate powers and lack of well
trained staff, the agency was unable to efficiently perform its duties for quite a
numbers of years. Over time, the agency’s powers were expanded, its autonomy was
strengthened, and the capability of its staff was increased, leading to a considerable
improvement in supervision.
It is difficult to rank by importance the factors discussed above in contributing
to the banks’ problems. It is widely agreed by people who have studied the history of
bank restructuring in Hungary that the most important contributing factor was the drop
in aggregate demand and output - - caused, as noted, by the collapse of the CMEA
trade and the initial negative effects of such reform measures as the liberalization of
trade and the elimination of subsidies - - which led to the insolvency of many firms.
The contribution of bad lending decisions and outright fraud to the losses of the banks
is estimated to have varied within a wide range of 10 to 40 percent depending on the
banks. The inherited bad loan portfolio from the period preceding the reforms comes
in as the second or third most important factor depending on the case.
III. Bank Consolidation
It became evident by 1992 that a consolidation and restructuring of the banking
system could be no longer postponed, as some of the state-owned banks lost their
entire capital. The consolidation started in late 1992 and proceeded in stages mainly
because, as is the case usually with banking crises, the problems surfaced only
gradually and the true magnitude of the problems did not become evident until 1993-
94. At the beginning of the process, there was a debate on whether consolidation
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should take the form of portfolio cleaning or recapitalization, and whether the banks’
bad loan portfolios should be transferred to a specialized institution charged to “work
out” the bad debt2 or the work-out should be left with the banks which, after all,
possessed the best information about the debtors. In the end, a combination of several
approaches and techniques was used, representing a compromise between the different
views.
The following is a brief summary of the different stages of the consolidation of
the banking sector3.
a) Portfolio cleaning
As a first step in the bank consolidation process, those banks and savings
cooperatives which had a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of less than about 7 percent
were given government bonds in exchange for their non-performing loans at the end of
1992. The bonds had a maturity of 20 years and carried market interest rates linked to
the three-month treasury bill interest rate. A part of the bad loans was sold by the
government at a discount to the Hungarian Development Bank (HDB) which was
charged with the work-out. Another part of the bad loans was left with the banks to be
worked out. To encourage the banks to work out the bad loans, the government gave
them a fee of 2 percent. However, this fee was too low and did not really encourage
the banks to do the work-out. Rather, they tried to sell the bad loans to different private
work-out companies which appeared on the market. Those loans that could not be
worked-out or sold that way were handed over to the HDB, which in many cases had
to write off the debt. Continuing the consolidation process, three banks were given
government bonds in exchange for bad loans on a case-by-case basis in March 1993.
Altogether, the cost of these first portfolio cleaning exercises amounted to the
equivalent of about 3.7 percent of GDP.
The above measure provided only a partial and temporary improvement in the
situation of the banking sector for two main reasons. First, the exchange of
government bonds for loans did not include doubtful and substandard loans and the
consolidation did not address the issue of the banks’ bad investments and contingent
liabilities (e.g. guarantees, unused lines of credit), which continued to burden the credit
institutions. Second, a major shortfall of this first attempt at consolidation was that it
was not tied to changes in the management and operations of the banks. The
government did order an audit of the banks participating in the portfolio cleaning, but
this audit was done very quickly and superficially. Consequently, the situation of the
banks continued the deteriorate because of continued bad banking practices, which
was compounded by the further worsening of the debtors’ financial position under the
lagged impact of the collapse of output and the effects of the enforcement of the
bankruptcy law.
                                             
2 The term “work-out” covers the different techniques to deal with non-performing debt. It might include
rescheduling of the debt, exchanging the debt for shares in the debtor company, forgiving part of the debt, or
writing off the debt altogether.
3 A detailed description and critique of the Hungarian bank consolidation between 1992 and 1994 can be found
in Ákos Balassa, “Restructuring and Recent Situation of the Hungarian Banking Sector”, National Bank of
Hungary, Workshop Studies, No. 4, 1996.
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b) Enterprise-oriented portfolio cleaning
In the second half of 1993, another partial consolidation measure was
implemented. This time the problem was approached from the side of the debtors. In
order to avoid the closing down of certain state-owned enterprises which the
authorities considered as important but which were unable to service their debt, the
government cleaned out their debts from the banks’ portfolio in exchange for
government bonds. Most of the debt taken over by the government was then written
off. At first, the debts of twelve large privileged industrial state-owned companies
were cleaned out that way, but a number of other firms were added to the list later. The
portfolio cleaning was successful in saving some of the large debtor firms, which were
reorganized and successfully privatized later. Some firms have remained in state
hands, while others had to be closed down eventually. The cost of this enterprise-
oriented portfolio cleaning reached the equivalent of about 1.6 percent of GDP.
c) Recapitalization
Despite the above consolidation attempts, the amount of non-performing loans
continued to increase to reach close to 30 percent of the total loan portfolio of the
banks in 1993 (Chart 1). By that time, the Hungarian rules of loan classification were
tightened to fully comply with international standards, which partly explains the
increase. However, the continued deterioration of the debtors’ financial position and
the accumulation of new bad loans were also contributing factors.
Chart 1
Hungary -Nonperforming Loans as a Percentage of Total Loans
Source: National Bank of Hungary
It thus became clear by late 1993 that partial portfolio cleanings will not solve the
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state, taking into account also the bad investments and contingent liabilities of the
banks, was necessary. The recapitalization was implemented in three stages during
1993-94. In the first stage, the CARs of eight participating banks were raised to about
zero percent. In the second stage, the CARs of these banks were increased to 4 percent.
In the third stage, the CARs of four large state-owned banks were raised to 8 percent,
i.e. the CAR required by the rules of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The
recapitalization in the first and second stages took mainly the form of the government
purchasing newly issued shares by the recapitalized banks. The government paid for
these shares by bonds issued with the same conditions as the earlier consolidation
bonds. As a result of this action, state ownership in the banking sector increased
temporarily (Chart 2). In the third stage, the recapitalization took the form of the
extension by the government of subordinated loans to the banks. This action did not
involve an increase in government ownership in the banks. The total amount of
recapitalization over the three stages amounted to the equivalent of 4.8 percent of
GDP.
Chart 2
Hungary - Ownership Structure of the Banking Sector
Source: National Bank of Hungary
Recognizing at last that the banks possessed the best information about the
debtors and were therefore the best placed to handle the problem loans, the latter were
left with the banks to be worked out this time. Most of the banks established separate
work-out units for that purpose, either within the bank or as an entity outside of the
bank. One of the objectives of setting up separate work-out units was to avoid that the
work-out activity interfere with the normal operations of the bank. An additional
objective was to separate the “good” bank from the “bad” bank to set the stage for the
privatization of the bank. There were also cases where the banks sold the bad debt to
private work-out organizations. Generally, it took between 1 to 2 years for the problem
loans to be worked out.
Learning from the previous mistakes when no detailed conditions were set for
the banks whose portfolio was cleaned, the banks which were recapitalized were now
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Own shares
Preference shares
Other foreign
investors
Foreign banks
Domestic private
persons
Domestic
enterprises
Direct state
ownership
13
required to submit a consolidation program aimed at putting the bank on a sound
footing. The programs included measures to streamline management, improve internal
controls and modernize the operations of the bank. The undertakings were set out in an
agreement which was signed by the bank and the Ministry of Finance.
In addition to the above described consolidation, two separate, but important
bank consolidations took place later. The only large state-owned commercial bank
which did not participate in the earlier consolidation schemes and was not privatized
run up huge losses and had to be consolidated in 1998, the cost of which reached the
equivalent of about 2 percent of GDP. Furthermore, a commercial bank operating
abroad and owned by the NBH turned out to have a large bad loan portfolio when the
NBH decided to sell it. After several attempts to sell the bank failed, the bank had to
be closed down in 2000, with the NBH suffering a loss equivalent to about 0.7 percent
of GDP. With this action, the consolidation of the Hungarian banking system had
come to an end. 
The total gross cost of the consolidation over the eight years from 1992 to 2000
amounted to approximately 13 percent of GDP. An international comparison suggests
that this cost was not exceptionally high and was much smaller than in some emerging
markets hit by financial crises in Latin America and Asia (Table 1).
Table 1
The Cost of Bank Consolidation in Selected Countries
Country Percent of GDP
Latin-America
Argentina (1980-82) 55 %
Chile (1981-85) 41%
Uruguay (1981-84) 31%
Venezuela (1994-95) 17%
Mexico (1994-95) 12-15 %
Brazil (1994-96) 5-10 %
Asia
Thailand (1997- ) 35 %
Indonesia (1997- ) 33 %
South-Korea (1997- ) 20 %
Malaysia (1997- ) 19 %
Transition countries
Bulgaria (1990s) 14%
Czech Republic (1990s)   18%*
Hungary (1991-2000) 13%
Poland (1990s) 6 %
Industrial countries
Spain (1977-85) 15-17%
Japan (1990s) 14 %
Finland (1991-94) 8 %
Sweden (1991-93) 4,5%
Norway (1987-89) 4%
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Sources:
(1) Bank for International Settlements, 66th Annual Report, 1996. (2) Gerard Caprio - Daniela
Klingebiel, “Bank Insolvencies: Cross-country Experience”, World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper 1620; 1996. (3) IMF: World Economic Outlook, 1998. (4) IMF, “International Capital Markets:
Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues”, September 2000. (5) Carl-Johan Lindgren - Gillian
Garcia - Matthew I. Saal, “Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy”. IMF, 1996. (6) Czech
National Bank.
* The consolidation of the banking system in the Czech Republic is still going on. Some estimates put
the total cost as high as 30 percent of GDP.
To a large extent, this was due to the relatively low level of financial depth in
Hungary. Chart 3 shows the total assets of the banking system as a percentage of GDP.
In 1992, i.e. prior to the bank consolidation, this ratio was about 75 percent in
Hungary, much lower than the ratios observed in the developed countries, ranging
between 150 percent and 325 percent. The ratio in Hungary declined even further to
reach less than 70 percent in 1999. This can be explained by the low level of credit to
the corporate and household sectors. As shown in Chart 4, such credit accounted for
only about 25 percent of GDP in Hungary, compared with more than 100 percent in
the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan and 70 percent in the United States. Several
factors explain this low level of credit. First, as a result of the privatization and the
inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), many companies operating in Hungary are
owned by multinational firms which borrow from their mother companies or from
banks abroad, bypassing the domestic banking system. At the same time, these
companies produce a major part of the Hungarian GDP, with foreign invested
companies accounting for about 70 percent of Hungary’s total exports. Second, many
Hungarian firms lack a sufficiently long track record to make them acceptable credit
risk for banks. Third, credit to households has been constraint by the low level of
incomes and the high risks involved in lending to this sector. Thus, one can say that
Hungary was “fortunate” that bank consolidation came at a time when the lack of
financial depth helped to limit the cost of consolidation.
Chart 3
Total Assets of the Banking System as a Percentage of GDP in 
Selected European Countries*
*1997 data for all countries other than Hungary
Sources: European Central Bank, “EU Banks Income Structure”, April 2000; 
and National Bank of Hungary
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Chart 4
Loans Extended to the Private Sector as a Percentage of GDP in
Selected Countries*
*Pre –crisis (1996) data for Korea and Thailand, 1999 data for other countries
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
IV. Privatization of the Banks
The government regarded the privatization of the state-owned banks as the final
step in strengthening and stabilizing the banking system. In formulating the
privatization strategy, it was concluded that the banks should preferably be sold to
strategic owners who can provide needed capital, technology and know-how. In
practice, this meant selling most of the Hungarian state-owned banks to foreign banks.
Six state-owned banks, representing a market share of 31 percent at the end of 1995,
were sold to foreign banks. In the first phase of the privatization, the government
maintained a minority shareholding in these banks. The European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also participated as a minority shareholder
in the privatization of three of the banks. The initial presence of the government and
the EBRD was regarded by the strategic buyers as some sort of guarantee should the
banks run into unanticipated difficulties. The minority shares were eventually
purchased by the strategic owners.
The government ruled that the NSB, the largest Hungarian bank with a market
share of 29 percent prior to the privatization, should be privatized through the stock
exchange. Besides the intention of keeping the management of the largest bank
entirely in Hungarian hands, another objective was to promote the development of the
domestic capital market. This bank has since performed well and is a strong
competitor in the market.
The increased presence of foreign investors in the Hungarian banking sector
was not only a result of privatization. Hungary has practiced a liberal licensing policy
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leading to many foreign banks setting up subsidiaries in Hungary. As a result of the
privatization and the “greenfield” establishment of foreign banks, the second half of
1990s witnessed a dramatic change in the ownership structure of the banking sector
(Chart 2). State ownership fell to 20 percent of the banking system’s share capital by
1997 and currently only one larger and one small commercial banks and a few credit
institutions fulfilling special functions remain in state ownership4. Foreign ownership
amounts to almost 70 percent5 of the share capital of the banking system and is
dominated by banks from the European Union (EU), a reflection of the close
integration of the country into the EU, which Hungary is expected to formally join
within the next few years.
It is widely agreed that the restructuring of ownership has strengthened and
stabilized the Hungarian banking system, as reflected in the current high level of CAR
(14 percent on average for the banking sector) and the improvement in the quality of
loan portfolio: the amount of non-performing loans as a proportion of the total loan
portfolio fell from 30 percent in 1993 to about 3 percent in 2000 (Chart 1). The
presence of foreign banks has been a major factor behind the increase in the quality
and variety of banking products and services. It also increased competition, helping to
compress the margins between deposit and loan interest rates from an average of over
9 percent in 1994 to about 3 percent currently. The presence of foreign banks has also
helped to boost Hungary’s attractiveness for FDI, as many interested foreign investors
can find in Hungary subsidiaries of banks operating in their home countries.
V. Bank Regulation and Supervision
The experience worldwide shows that the quality and effectiveness of bank
regulation and supervision plays an important role in preventing bank crises.
Prudential regulation and supervision have greatly improved over the years in
Hungary. The government has been aided in this effort by the EU accession process
which requires the harmonization of the Hungarian regulatory frameworks with those
in effect in the EU. Bank supervision was strengthened by granting greater autonomy
to the bank supervisory agency and by improving the skills of its staff through training
and the hiring of better qualified personnel. The move from an institution-based to a
group-based supervision was also intended to improve supervision. This move
involved merging under the aegis of a single agency the supervision of banks,
brokerage firms, insurance companies and pension funds. The resulting consolidation
of the supervisory activities permits a more effective supervision of financial groups
when banks own brokerage firms, insurance companies and pension funds. There is a
trend internationally and also in Hungary for banks to expand their activities into these
financial services. During the Russian financial crisis of 1998, many Hungarian banks
suffered losses as a result of the substantial open foreign exchange position of their
brokerage firms, underlying the importance of a consolidated approach to supervision.
                                             
4 These are the Eximbank, the Hungarian Development Bank, four housing savings institutions and two
mortgage banks.
5 This number includes the minority holdings by foreigners of NSB’s shares.
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VI. The Experience of Some Other Transition Countries6
The bank reforms in Poland and the Czech Republic were broadly similar to
that in Hungary but were implemented at a somewhat later date. The difficulties faced
by the banking systems of these countries stemmed by and large from the same
sources as in Hungary, namely the drop in GDP; inherited bad loan portfolios; lack of
prudent risk management and lending owing to weak management practices; and
shortcomings in the regulatory framework and bank supervision. While the Polish
banking sector attained stability thanks to a consolidation-cum-privatization program,
the Czech banking reform has taken longer. In Poland, the problem loans were left
with the banks to be worked out. Recapitalization was tied to the banks improving
their operations and risk management practices. Simultaneously with the consolidation
program, Poland was also strengthening supervision. The cost of consolidation is
estimated at 6 percent of GDP, less then in the Czech Republic or Hungary (Table 1).
One reason for the lower cost is that the bank credit to GDP ratio prior to the
consolidation was only 11 percent on Poland, much lower than either in Hungary (33
percent) or the Czech Republic (51 percent)7. The Polish banking sector, like that of
Hungary, is dominated by foreign banks.
Restructuring of the Czech banking sector took place in three stages. First came
the consolidation of large banks in the early 1990s, followed by the consolidation of
medium-sized and small banks in the mid-1990s, and finally by the implementation of
a stabilization plan targeting small banks. Success of the restructuring of the banking
sector depended largely on the success of transferring the leading Czech banks into the
hands of strategic private owners capable of effective corporate governance, since the
earlier coupon-based privatization of these banks had resulted in a scattered ownership
structure which, together with the restriction on foreign ownership, meant that in
practice the state retained control over the banks. In order to improve the management
and operation of the banks, the government adopted a new privatization program in
1997 with the aim of selling the large banks to foreign banks. The privatization
process is all but completed by now, but the operations of the privatized banks is being
hampered by the large-scale reorganizations that had to be carried out by the new
owners, and by the lingering problems associated with the large size of non-
performing loans. 
VII. Current Trends in the Hungarian Banking Sector and Prospects
As discussed above, the depth of financial intermediation is low in Hungary.
However, after declining through 1997, the total assets of the banking system as a ratio
of GDP has started to rise (Chart 5). This trend is expected to continue with the
                                             
6 This section draws  on information from the following sources: (1) Fernando Montes-Negret  Luca Papi, "The
Polish Experience in Bank and Enterprise Restructuring", World Bank, January 1997. (2) Moody's, "Czech
Republic  Banking System Outlook", October 2000. (3) IMF, "Poland - Selected Issues", IMF Staff Country
Reports No. 99/32, 1999. (4) IMF, "Czech Republic - Selected Issues", IMF Staff Country Reports No. 98/36,
1998.
7 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
18
development of the economy in general and of the small- and medium-sized domestic
enterprise sector in particular. Lending to the household sector is also expected to rise
as a result of the growth in household incomes and the efforts by banks, driven by
competition, to expand their areas of activities. The widening of the exchange rate
band to ± 15 percent in May 2001 and the consequent increase in the exchange rate
risk is also likely to encourage the corporate sector to rely somewhat less on borrowing
from abroad and to increase their borrowing in domestic currency from banks in
Hungary as a means of hedging their risk8. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the depth of
financial intermediation in Hungary will reach the level attained in the EU any time
soon, since the multinational firms will continue to dominate the corporate sector for
some time to come and these firms will tend to rely to an extent on borrowing from
their mother companies abroad.
Chart 5
Hungary - Total Assets of Credit Institutions as a Percentage of GDP
Source: National Bank of Hungary
A trend that might also put a constraint on the development of financial
intermediation through the Hungarian banking system is the declining share of the
households’ financial savings held in the form of bank deposits in favor of other forms
of savings, such as government securities, life insurance and pension funds (Chart 6).
Since this trend is likely to continue and might not be offset by a sufficiently rapid
growth in total household savings, large corporate clients might find it difficult to
satisfy their borrowing needs in domestic currency, as the prudential limits on the
banks’ open positions will limit the banks ability to borrow from abroad to meet the
                                             
8 Between March 1995 and May 2001, a preannounced crawling peg with a narrow band of ± 2.25 percent was
in effect in Hungary. The relatively low level of exchange rate risk encouraged borrowing from abroad to take
advantage of the lower foreign interest rates. 
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demand for credit. Thus, banks in Hungary might not be able to exploit to its full
potential the competitive edge that they have in the domestic currency market. 
Chart 6
Hungary - Breakdown of Financial Assets of Households by Form of Holdings
Source: National Bank of Hungary
Reflecting the history of the development of the banking sector in Hungary,
there is a wide difference in the degree of concentration between the corporate and the
household credit markets. In the corporate sector, the concentration is relatively low,
with the Herfindahl index being just above 600 both for corporate loans and deposits
(Chart 7)9. This reflects the presence of the many foreign bank subsidiaries which
started operations in Hungary as a greenfield project initially concentrating on the less
risky corporate market10. In the household sector, the concentration is much higher
because of the dominance of the NSB which initially had enjoyed a quasi monopoly in
this market. However, the degree of concentration has fallen sharply in the household
market, with the Herfindahl index dropping from almost 7000 in 1994 to about 2000 in
the year 2000 (Chart 8). This development reflects the efforts of foreign-owned banks
to extend their activities to the household sector in order both to increase their deposit
base and to capture a greater share of the household credit market. The resulting
increase in competition has led to a substantial improvement in the banking services
provided to households. One measure if this improvement is the rapid growth of bank
cards from 75 per 1000 inhabitants in 1995 to 450 in 2000.
                                             
9 The Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the squares of each bank’s market share in percent. If there
were only one bank, the Herfindahl index would be 10.000 (100% x 100%). A value in excess of 1.500 is
considered as representing significant concentration.
10 Of the 29 foreign-owned commercial banks, 21 are greenfield projects and 8 are privatized banks.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
cash
investment funds, life insurance and pension funds                    
stocks and corporate bonds
government securities
bank deposits and bank securities
20
Chart 7
Hungary - Market Concentration of Corporate Loans and Deposits 
(Herfindahl-index)
Source: National Bank of Hungary
Chart 8
Hungary - Market Concentration of Household Loans and Deposits
(Herfindahl-index)
Source: National Bank of Hungary
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The robust economic growth, together with the decline in inflation and the
consequent fall in the return on government securities, have led to an increase of the
share of loans to the corporate and household sectors in the total assets of banks. This
share, which stagnated at 33-34 percent during 1995-98, rose to almost 42 percent in
2000 (Chart 9). Despite this shift toward more risky assets, the share of non-
performing loans in the total loan portfolio of banks continued to decline as mentioned
earlier (Chart 1).
Chart 9
Hungary - Corporate and Household Loans as a Percentage of Total Assets
Source: National Bank of Hungary
The profitability of banks, as measured by the pre-tax return on equity (ROE),
evolved very differently for the banks established as greenfield projects and for the
large privatized banks (Chart 10). For the former, the ROE declined in 1997-99, but
remained positive and recovered in 2000. The decline reflected the fall in the rate of
inflation, the narrowing of the interest rate margins due to the intensified competition,
and the cost of investments aimed at developing banking business in the retail sector.
For the large privatized banks, the ROE fell sharply and turned negative during 1998-
2000, showing that the restructuring of the formerly state-owned banks is a difficult
and time consuming process. Despite progress in reducing operating costs, the ratio of
such costs to the total assets of the banking system as a whole remains high by
international standards (Chart 11), but the ratio is much higher in the formerly state-
owned privatized banks than in the greenfield banks. 
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Chart 10
Hungary - Return on Equity*
*Calculated with pre-tax profit; the Postabank, the Hungarian Development Bank and the
Realbank are not included.
Source: National Bank of Hungary
Chart 11
Operating Costs as a Percentage of Total Assets in Selected EU
and Central European Countries*
Sources: European Central Bank; National Bank of Hungary
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The setting up of subsidiaries by many foreign banks has led to the Hungarian
market being over-banked: the average size of banks is 700 million dollars, compared
with an average of 2.6 billion dollars in the euro zone11. This situation is likely to
change as competition will push toward greater concentration in the banking sector in
the years to come. The concentration has already started with mergers and acquisitions
initiated in Hungary, or as a result of mergers of the mother banks abroad. Some
foreign bank subsidiaries already closed their operations and withdrew from the
Hungarian market. When this process is over, there will be a fewer number, but larger
sized banks, providing a full range of corporate and retail banking services. Some
foreign bank subsidiaries, rather then withdrawing altogether from the Hungarian
market, might downgrade their presence to a representative office, providing a limited
range of services to their preferred corporate customers.
VIII. Lessons from the Hungarian Bank Reform
There are lessons to be drawn from the Hungarian experience with bank reform,
a few of which are worthwhile to highlight.
1. Consolidation of the banking system should be based on an accurate assessment
of the sources of difficulties of the banks. It is true that the multi-phased consolidation
applied by the Hungarian government was partly imposed by the events, as the
deterioration of the debtors’ financial position was prompted by a fall in aggregate
demand and output of which both the long duration and the magnitude were
unanticipated. Nevertheless, it can be said that a more thorough examination of the
banks’ financial situation would have revealed earlier the extent of the problems faced
by the banks and would have allowed a more careful planning of the consolidation
process. In this respect, it is important to emphasize that the enforcement of strict loan
classification and provisioning rules according to international standards will help the
problems to surface early.
2. There was a debate in Hungary whether the responsibility to work out the bad
loans should be given to a separate central institution or should be left with the banks.
Initially both methods were tried, but it soon became apparent that banks were much
more successful in working out the loans if they were given the right incentives. The
incentive was that the banks could retain the difference between the actual loan
recovery rate and the assumed recovery rate on which the consolidation was based.
The biggest drawback of a central work-out institution is the loss of information about
the debtors when the portfolio is transferred out of the creditor bank. When the work-
out responsibility is left with the bank, it is important to separate the normal activities
of the bank (“good” bank) from the work-out activity (“bad” bank) so that the former
can concentrate on client relationship and is not burdened with the task of debt
collection. The staff of the work-out unit should be given incentives to finish the job
speedily, otherwise self preservation will draw out the process for too long.
                                             
11 These numbers include the savings cooperatives in the euro zone which are excluded in Hungary where they
are very small. Excluding the savings cooperatives in the euro zone as well, the difference in the average size of
banks is even larger.
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3. If consolidation takes place in several stages as in Hungary, the issue of “moral
hazard” is raised: there is a danger that the banks, counting on another rescue
operation, will not improve their operations and engage in sufficiently prudent lending.
In this regard, the greatest weakness of the Hungarian consolidation process was that
in the first phases of the consolidation, the banks were not compelled by the
government to implement internal reforms to improve the efficiency of their
operations by restructuring management, reducing costs, and strengthening risk
assessment and internal controls. When banks were eventually required to submit a
restructuring program under the recapitalization phase, the implementations of the
programs were not adequately monitored and enforced by the government. This can be
partly explained by the fact that the government did not wish to keep the banks in
public ownership and regarded the consolidation as a step toward the privatization of
the banks. However, privatization itself took longer than expected so that the lack of
adequate restructuring  of the banks prior to privatization resulted in the end in a lower
sales price, i.e. smaller privatization receipts for the government. In other words, bank
reform should address adequately both the “stock” problem through recapitalization
or portfolio cleaning and the “flow” problem through measures designed to prevent
the reproduction of losses.
4. Privatization is no panacea, but experience worldwide has shown that state-
owned banks are more likely to get into trouble then private banks. It is the view of
this author that the consolidation of banks in a country moving from a centrally
managed to a market economy should be followed by the privatization of the banks.
The choice of an appropriate privatization strategy is crucial. The coupon-based
privatization in the Czech Republic turned out to be a failure, while the privatization of
banks into the hands of strategic owners in Hungary and Poland proved to be
beneficial. There is also an example of successful privatization through the stock
exchange, that of the NSB in Hungary. The important thing is to have an ownership
structure that ensures effective corporate governance. Experience worldwide shows
that ownership through the stock exchange is a powerful disciplinary force for the
management of any bank and the Hungarian experience with NSB confirms that this
can work in a transition country as well. At the same time, the presence of foreign
banks can infuse useful competition into the banking system.
5. Consolidation of the banking system should be accompanied by the
improvement of prudential regulation and the strengthening of supervision. It is very
important that the supervisory authority be granted enough autonomy from the
government and be empowered to use adequate supervisory measures and sanctions. 
6. It should be strongly emphasized that the success of bank consolidation
depends in the end on the health of the corporate sector. Banks are as good as the
economy in which they operate. Bank reform must be accompanied by the
restructuring of the corporate sector if one of the major sources of the difficulties
encountered by the banks was the weak financial position of the debtors. In Hungary,
this restructuring was brought about by the strict enforcement of a stringent
bankruptcy law and by the privatization to strategic owners of state-owned enterprises.
In a transition economy, it is crucial that the restructuring of the banking and
corporate sectors go in tandem. Banks must divest themselves not only of their bad
loans but also of their bad clients.
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7. The Hungarian authorities’ liberal policy of bank licensing and the privatization
to strategic owners have resulted in the Hungarian market being dominated by foreign
banks. This has helped to achieve a relatively high level of capital adequacy ratio for
the banking system as a whole and has also led to a substantial improvement in
banking services, accompanied by a marked narrowing of the interest rate spreads. The
foreign bank subsidiaries established as greenfield projects have been slow to move
into the retail banking business, but this has changed in recent years with some of the
foreign-owned banks moving aggressively into this area. Hungary was the first country
in Central and Eastern Europe to start reforming its banking system and foreign banks
were eager to establish themselves in the country in the initial years of the reforms in
order to secure a presence in Central Europe. However, a process of concentration has
started now, as foreign banks are reassessing their role in Hungary in the light of their
relative competitive position in the country and their global strategy in the region. One
lesson of the Hungarian experience is that the restructuring of the large formerly state-
owned privatized banks proves to be a difficult task as reflected by the negative ROEs
of these banks for the last three years. Owing to the large presence of multinational
firms and the low leverage of the Hungarian corporate and household sectors, the
depth of financial intermediation is low, constraining the efficiency of monetary
policy.
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